The End of the Red Rubber System in the Congo Free State

Introduction

At the end of the Berlin conference, the Belgian King Leopold II passed through the gates of the Radziwill palace with most of what currently constitutes the Democratic Republic of Congo as his private property (Vianae 745). Around the same time, the demand for rubber started increasing (Frank and Musacchio). Fortunately for the King of Belgium, the forests of his newly acquired colony were full of rubber vines. However, he lacked the funding to exploit the rubber, so he invented an exploitative system to maximize rubber production while minimizing the costs: the red rubber system. The natives, especially the men but sometimes even women and children, were forced to collect rubber while their families were held hostage by the rubber companies’ agents (De Mesquina 205). If the quota expected was not met, then the man or children were beaten, mutilated, or even killed or their family members were either killed or mutilated (Anstey 63). This system was implemented by concession companies — private companies that were granted exclusive rights to exploit natural resources from a specific area of the country — such as Anglo-Belgian India Rubber Company (ABIR), the Société Anversoise du Commerce au Congo (Anversoise) and the Compagnie du Kasai (Vianae 770).

While it is agreed among most historians that Leopold II established the red rubber system for financial reasons, not genocidal ones - although millions of people perished from it (Mul 590) - there is no consensus of opinions among them as to the reasons behind the end of the exploitative system and when exactly it ended. Some historians ascribe the end of the red rubber system to the humanitarian actions of activists such as E.D. Morel and argue that the system ended in 1908-10 after Belgium took over Congo (Stengers 197), others opine that the system ended a few years ago, between 1904 and 1906 due to the depletion of rubber vines in the forests of Congo (Harms 75). Other scholars assert that the red rubber system ended in 1913, as a result of the drop in rubber prices on the international market in 1912 which made the rubber industry less profitable and caused the rubber companies to either go bankrupt or focus on the exploitation of other goods (Harms 200).

From this divergence of opinions among scholars, a research question emerges: “ What was the main factor that led to the end of the red rubber system in the Congo Free State?”

To answer this question, I analyzed the impact of each factor aforementioned on the red rubber system. Works of respected historians such as Adam Hoschild’s “King Leopold’s Ghost, A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa”, Jean Stenger's “Congo, Myths and Realities, 100 years of History” and Jules Marchal’s “E. D. Morel Against Leopold II: The history of the Congo 1900-1910” were used to study the impact of humanitarian action on the red rubber system. Robert Harms’ article “ Red Rubber, a Reassessment” and his book “Land of Tears, the Exploration and Exploitation of Equatorial Africa” proved useful in assessing the impact of the depletion of rubber by providing the rubber companies’ perspective which challenged the argument that the red rubber system was ended by humanitarian action. Jan Vansina’s “Being Colonised” provided useful insights into the effect of the drop in rubber prices on the rubber industry in Congo.

A key challenge faced was the lack of primary sources from the concession companies since most of their archives were destroyed by Leopold II to cover himself up. To overcome this challenge, Robert Harms’ book Land of Tears, the Exploration and Exploitation of Equatorial Africa was consulted because it offered a unique and detailed view of the situation from the concession companies’ perspective.

Humanitarian Action and International Outcry

It can be argued that the international outcry caused by the humanitarian actions of people like E.D. Morel and his organization, the Congo Reform Association, CRA, strongly contributed to the end of the red rubber system in the Congo Free State. Morel’s campaign raised awareness about the red rubber issue, which was unknown in most countries before the campaign started. Indeed, by 1905, the CRA had established branches in Brussels in Belgium, in 4 cities in the US, in 5 cities in the UK, and in Amsterdam in the Netherlands (Hochschild 215). The CRA used public rallies in each of those countries to raise awareness about the Red Rubber system in Congo and exert pressure on the local governments to act accordingly. Thousands protested against it in Liverpool, England, Scotland, New York City, Boston, Chicago, Brussels, and Amsterdam (Hochschild 215). Thanks to Edmund Morel’s protests against the exploitation of the indigenous population of Congo, almost the whole world knew about the red rubber system by the end of 1905, especially the most powerful countries of the time who had the power to take action against Leopold II.

Morel shook the foundations of Leopold II’s empire by exposing his network of fraud and corruption designed to preserve the fake image of the “civilized colony” Leopold II wanted the international community to have of the Congo Free State. For example, in 1903, Morel revealed that Leopold II had bought the favors of Sir Hugh Gilzean Reid, a prominent British newspaper owner, by giving him the Order of Leopold, an important national Belgian order of knighthood, and by making him the Knight Commander of the order of the crown, in exchange of Sir Gilzean praising Leopold II’s rule in the Congo Free State in his newspaper (Hochschild 190). The same year, after Leopold II denied the accusations from Morel of kidnapping of wives and kids and their bodily detention to force their husbands to gather rubber, Morel published the forms that A.B.I.R. agents were supposed to fill in for every autochthon under bodily detention (Hochschild 190). This sabotaged Leopold II‘s attempt to control the opinion of the international community on what was really happening in Congo (Hochschild 192). Thanks to these revelations, Britain realized that most of what was being told about how respectful of human rights was the rule of Leopold II in the CFS was dubious (Hochschild 194). Thus, in May 1903, the House of Commons adopted Herbert Samuel’s motion urging the British government to take action against the atrocities that were being committed in Congo, and the British government published on August 8, 1903, a diplomatic document urging the signatory nations of the Berlin Conference to take action against the rubber atrocities (Hochschild 202). However, these policies had very little impact on the situation in Congo since out of the 14 nations, only Britain and Turkey pressured Belgium to end those atrocities (Starr 390). Besides, at this stage, no major action was undertaken against the red rubber system neither by Belgium nor by Leopold II (Hochschild 196).

Another important outcome of Morel’s campaign over Britain was the decision of the Foreign Office to send an investigator, Consul Roger Casement, to Congo to dispel the doubts about the integrity of Morel’s accusations (Hwakins66).

Roger Casement's conclusions, which were sent to the Foreign Office in 1904 in what is called the Casement Report, confirmed Morel’s accusations (Marchal 149). However, the Belgian Consul in Congo Alfred L. Jones threatened that if the report was too harmful to the CFS, Leopold II would sell it to Germany (Hochschild 215), so, the Foreign Office attenuated the effect of Casement’s report on public opinion by removing the names of all the victims cited in the report. However, despite Leopold’s attempt to attenuate its impact, the Casement report instilled reasonable doubt among the Belgians and other countries which led them to pressure Leopold II to send an international Commission of Inquiry to Congo. Indeed, after the publication of the Casement report, the member of the Belgian parliament Emile Vandervelde, supported by a faction of Belgian conservative Catholics, the Belgian Prime Minister Bernaert, and other countries such as the US, Germany, and the UK pressured the King to create an international commission of inquiry to investigate on the red rubber system (Kabue 34). Thus, although the Casement report had very little direct impact on the situation in Congo, it persuaded the international community to investigate more about the accusations of Morel in a way that would be immune to Leopold II’s disinformation maneuvers.

In November 1905, the 3 judges from 3 different countries, Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland, were appointed the lead the mission of the commission (Daniels 892). The rapport of the Commission convinced Belgium of the veracity of the accusations about the Red Rubber atrocities because, unlike the Casement rapport, the impartiality of the Commission left no doubt (Stengers 124).

In order to maximize the impact of the report of the Commission when Leopold II tried to prevent its publication, Morel wrote a pamphlet summarizing the findings of the Commission in 1905 and sent a copy to every member of the Belgian Parliament who pressured Leopold II, even more, to cede Congo to his country (Hochschild 120). Thus, in 1906, Sir Edward Grey, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, pronounced himself in favor of a takeover of the CFS by Belgium, and Leopold II agreed to cede the colony to his country (Stengers 170).

Despite Morel’s effort to end the red rubber system, the treaty of cession of the Congo to Belgium drafted in 1907 let the “Crown Domain '' - a vast territory in Congo rich in natural resources, including rubber - into the hands of Leopold II. Thus, the end of the end of the red rubber system was not guaranteed. Thus, Morel organized a meeting of the CRA in London on January 21, 1908, where a petition was signed, urging the British government to put in place a plan of action pressuring the Belgian government to elaborate a treaty of cession that would guarantee the respect of the indigenous rights and the cessation of any violation of human rights committed on them (Marchal 149). Following that meeting and other several similar meetings such as the Queen’s Hall’s meeting the next month, the “House of Commons” voted a resolution on February 26, 1908, according to the recommendations of the CRA (Marchal 347). London threatened to take over the colony by force until the signatory countries of the Berlin treaty decided on the future of the Congo if that draft of the cession treaty did not ensure the end of the abusive rule of Leopold II (Marchal 339). After the climate of agitation and international pressure created by E.D. Morel, the Belgian prime minister Franz Schollaert convinced the King to give up on the “Crown Domain'' (Marchal 349).

The international pressure ultimately led King Leopold II to sell Congo to Belgium. As a result, in 1910, the Belgian government initiated a series of reforms to end the Leopoldian system by establishing freedom of trade and work for indigenous people. The rubber tax was canceled (Maquet et al. 181). Although the implementation of new policies by the new rulers took time, many people witnessed a certain improvement with the arrival of the new rulers as the historian Adam Hochschild reported in King Leopold’s Ghost. For example, Morel received letters from some missionaries in Congo telling him that the situation had improved since the arrival of the Belgians (Hochschild 250). Additionally, the British anti-slavery campaigners Alice and JTo after a trip to Congo in 1912, announced that the situation had immensely improved (Hochschild 250). British consuls led inspection tours in the colony and presented similar conclusions(Hochschild 250). However, these observations were limited to only some regions of the country, thus, they cannot be fully trusted to conclude that the red rubber system was totally over. Besides, in 1913, a Belgian missionary, Father Van Deu Hevel wrote a letter to the Belgian government complaining about the natives still collecting rubber under coercion (Hochschild 250). However, the argument that the red rubber system was destroyed in the early years that followed the Belgian takeover of Congo is reinforced by the fact that it is claimed by a book published in 1998, almost a century after the events it relates occurred. Thus, it presents the benefit of hindsight. Besides, the book abounds in works cited which shows that it was well documented and is thus reliable. However, his perspective should be considered carefully because, as he declared in an interview, he wrote the book out of outrage for what Leopold II had done in Congo (Hochschild). His book is therefore not a neutral or objective account of history, but rather a passionate and polemical work.

British economic interests

Some argue that the reason why Britain was involved in the Congo question was not humanitarian, but because Britain was aiming at seizing the territory of Congo for its own benefit.

The Belgians suspected that Great Britain was hiding behind humanitarianism its real intention of destabilizing Leopold II’s rule in Congo to annex it to its territories (Ndaywel è Nziem 359). The Belgians thought that just like the British used violence to acquire Transvaal, they were trying to do the same thing with the Congo, and they considered Morel because he was born in Liverpool, as an agent of the traders of Liverpool, who were angry not to have access to the market in Congo (Stengers 122). For example, the Belgian liberal leader Paul Janson declared in 1903: «I cannot admit that the State of the Congo is put under suspicion. I can mainly associate myself with a campaign whose last word seems to be: get up from there so that I can sit there.» (Stengers 122) and a liberal newspaper expressed «the feeling of indignant revolt inspired by the anti-Congolese campaign that has been carried out for some time with the visible and dishonest aim of pure and simple expropriation» (Stengers 122). This shows that many believed that the campaign that most consider to be the cause of the end of the red rubber system was not motivated by humanitarian reasons but rather by financial interests.

Besides, what really convinced Leopold II to cede Congo were the threats of Britain to take over the colony and balkanize it (Kabue 34). Indeed, after the publication of the rapport of the commission, Fitzmaurice, an influential member of the British Foreign Office threatened to dislocate the CFS between Britain, Germany, and the US (Marchal 149). Britain went even further in its threats by announcing in 1906 its desire to organize another Berlin Conference where the issue of the abuses in Congo and the fate of the Colony would be discussed (Ndaywel è Nziem 369). From a telegram from Berlin of Baron Greidnl in December 1906, Leopold II learned that Germany would be on the side of Britain if such a conference was organized (Stengers 171). The same year, President Roosevelt declared that he would also support such a conference because Morel recently divulged that Leopold II had corrupted an important American army officer, Colonel Henry Kowasky, and several American newspaper owners (Stengers 171). The French Minister of Foreign Affairs Pichon declared that Paris too would take the side of London (Ndaywel è Nziem 361). Torn between his colony falling under Britain’s colonial ambition or being given to Belgium sooner than planned, Leopold II agreed in 1906 to cede it to Belgium, and the final act of cession would be signed later, in 1908 (Ndaywel è Nziem 361).

Depletion of rubber vines

The depletion of rubber wines in the Congo Free State in the early 1900s significantly affected the rubber industry and thus the atrocities committed on the natives. The constant pressure of the concession companies on their agents to meet very high quotas of rubber ultimately led to the depletion of rubber vines in most concessions (Harms 76). The problem with rubber exploitation in the Congo Free State was that the rubber mainly came from vines, not trees, and vines are less durable than trees since they die right after being exploited (Harms 77). In the ABIR concession, for example, rubber production dropped by 1906, together with the rubber atrocities reported by the missionaries in the area due to the exhaustion of rubber supplies (Harms 77). According to Robert Harms, the rubber system was over in the Abir concession in 1906, when the international debate about red rubber was just beginning, not because of international pressure but because the concession had run out of rubber (Sternstein 477).

The main goal of ABIR was maximizing the profits. So, the company took control of as many villages as possible, expanding beyond the borders of its territory, and its agents imposed, in each village, a certain amount of rubber to reach. The agents received a commission of 2 percent of the rubber collected, however, if they did not satisfy the quota, the rubber missing was subtracted from their salary (Harms 79). Although this system astronomically increased the production of the company in the early 1900s, the depletion of rubber occasioned by this intensive exploitation ultimately ruined the company. The fewer rubber vines there were, the more the natives were pressured by ABIR agents to meet the quotas, and the more rubber vines were exploited and destroyed (Harms 79). Besides, some villagers destroyed the vines on purpose because they believed that if the rubber supplies were exhausted, the ABIR agents would leave. The constant pressure put on the villagers to bring more and more rubber despite the scarcity of the vines led them to rebel against their oppressors. For example, 142 ABIR sentries were killed by the indigenous in 1905, and this significantly affected the ability of the company to carry on with its activities (Harms 85). Ultimately, the depletion of rubber vines reduced the cases of violence in rubber exploitation after Inspector Gerard informed Leopold II that there were almost no more rubber vines in the concessions, since then less pressure was put on the ABIR agents (Harms 89). However, it did not end them. Some missionaries still reported some cases of violence, but less than before.

One of the reasons behind the bankruptcy of Anversoise company was the fact that when rubber vines were exhausted and the population was still pressured to meet high rubber quotas, the indigenous would tap vines of “false rubber” which produced a substance resembling real latex. This significantly reduced the quality of the rubber produced by Anversoise and Anversoise customers complained about the low quality of the rubber and many of them eventually stopped buying the rubber from the Company (Harms 842). Since the Anversoise company was no longer profitable, the Congo Free State suspended its concession rights in March 1904 (Harms 844).

Because of the increased pressure of the Abir company on the population to meet high rubber quotas and the impossibility of meeting the quotas due to the depletion of rubber vines, several people living in the Abir concession fled from it (Harms 848). This reduced the work power of the Company. In 1903, six villages in the Abir concession, Likongo, Lianja, Nkole, Yanga-Yanju, Nongo-Ingoli, and Lofoma, deserted from their inhabitants (Harms 848). Other villages scattered into small groups, abandoned their villages, and settled in the forest to escape Abir’s impossible-to-meet quotas (Harms 848).

With the rubber becoming scarcer and the rubber companies remaining adamant with the rubber quotas, rebellions rose from the local population. In the Abir concession, for example, during the rebellion of the Seketulu people, 400 people were killed and over a hundred people died in prison (Harms 851). Between 1901 and 1903, Abir crushed the Yamongo, Mongo, Bofongi, Lilangi, Bokenda, Pukaonga, and Kailanga rebellions with death rates similar to the Seketu rebellion previously mentioned (Harms 852).

Drop in rubber prices

However, one can argue that the end of the red rubber system was due to the drop in rubber prices in the 1910s which made the rubber industry unprofitable. In the early 1910s, the price of rubber dropped due to the increasing availability of synthetic rubber and the establishment of rubber plantations in other parts of the world such as British Malaysia and the Dutch East Indies, regions where rubber was produced at a lower price on a large scale thanks to good weather conditions (Vansina 170). Thus, the price of rubber dropped from $ 1.80 per pound in 1895 to $ 0.25 per pound in 1912 (Taylor 3). This fall in rubber prices contributed to the decline of the rubber industry in the Congo Free State. Since the rubber system mainly depended on the profitability of rubber, with the fall of rubber prices the rubber companies lost not only the incentive to carry on the rubber exploitation but also the financial capacity to maintain the infrastructure and personnel required to carry out the forced labor and mining operations associated with the rubber industry in the Congo Free State. For example, the Anglo-Belgian India Rubber Company ( ABIR) which was the largest rubber company in the Congo Free State (CFS) had to lower the salaries of its employees by 50% in 1912 (Vansina 188). This reduced the motivation of ABIR agents to carry on the forced labor system. Another rubber company, the Compagnie du Kasaï lowered its employees’ salary by 40% in 1909 and went bankrupt in 1910 (Vansina 189). The company even abandoned many of its stations and trading posts in the early 1900s due to the lack of funds (Vansina 189). The Société Anonyme Forestière et Minière du Congo (SAMFCO) reduced its salaries by 30% in 1907 and eventually went bankrupt in 1911 (Vansina 174). The drop in rubber prices affected the capacity of rubber companies to maintain the infrastructures and staff necessary to carry on the rubber industry thus, fewer atrocities were committed on the local population. Besides, with the drop in rubber prices, rubber was no longer as profitable as it used to be. Thus, many rubber companies scaled down their rubber exploitation operations and focused on more rentable products. For example, the Compagnie du Kasaï reduced its rubber operations in 1910 and focused more on coffee production while SAMFCO focused more on diamond production (Vansina 175).

Conclusion

The depletion of the rubber vines in the companies’ concessions significantly affected the rubber industry in Congo. It caused the bankruptcy of several companies, and many others had to scale down their operations. Besides, with the rebellions caused by the impossible-to-meet rubber quotas of the companies, many companies lost their personnel and important infrastructure to keep ruling the rubber industry. However, some of the companies kept operating after 1906, although it was on a lower scale than before. So, the depletion of rubber vines significantly weakened the rubber industry in Congo, but it did not end it.

Morel’s campaign and Britain’s ambitions in Congo, on the other hand, led Belgium to take control of Congo and abolish the red rubber tax in most regions. This improved the situation of the indigenous in general, as testified by the reports of some missionaries and even British commissioners sent to Congo to ensure the end of the rubber system. However, the rubber industry was already weakened by the depletion of rubber, thus, the situation was a bit better before the arrival of the Belgians and the Belgian government did not do anything to ensure the implementation of the abolishment of the red rubber tax. Thus, there were still some cases of forced labor by rubber companies. Morel’s campaign legally ended the red rubber system, but it did not totally eradicate it.

The drop in rubber prices is what gave the coup de grace to the red rubber taxes. Thanks to it, there was no more interest in exploiting rubber, especially since it had become illegal to force the indigenous to collect it. This eliminated the last incentive that the rubber companies had to maintain the exploitative red rubber system.

M.M.P.

Works Cited

Anstey, Roger. “The Congo Rubber Atrocities -- A Case Study.” African Historical Studies, vol. 4, no. Rubber atrocities, 1971, pp. 59-76.

Daniels, John. “The Congo Question and the "Belgian Solution." The North American Review, vol. 188, no. University of Northern Iowa, Dec. 1908, pp. 891-902.

De Mesquina, Bruce Bueno. “Leopold II and the Selectorate: An Account in Contrast to a Racial Explanation.” Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung, vol. 32, no. New Political Economy in History, 2007, pp. 203-221.

Frank, Zephyr, and Aldo Musacchio. “The International Natural Rubber Market, 1870-1930.” EH.Net, https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-international-natural-rubber-market-1870-1930/. Accessed 14 October 2023.

Harms, Robert. “The End of Red Rubber: A Reassessment.” Journal of African History, vol. 16, no. Critics of historians, 1975, pp. 73-88.

Harms, Robert. Land of Tears: The Exploration and Exploitation of Equatorial Africa. Basic Books, 2019.

Hochschild, Adam. “Adam Hochschild.” Fresh Air Archive, https://freshairarchive.org/guests/adam-hochschild. Accessed 15 October 2023.

Hochschild, Adam. King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa. Macmillan, 1999.

Hwakins, Hant. “Joseph Conrad, Roger Casement, and the Congo Reform Movement.” Journal of Modern Literature, vol. 9, no. Indiana University Press, 1982.

Kabue, Buana. L'expérience zaïroise: du casque colonial à la toque de léopard. Afrique biblio club, 1975.

Maquet, Emma, et al. Histoire de l'Afrique centrale: à l'usage des lycées et collèges. Présence africaine, 1971.

Marchal, Jules. E.D. Morel contre Léopold II: l'histoire du Congo, 1900-1910. Harmattan, 1996. Mul, Sarah De. “THE HOLOCAUST AS A PARADIGM FOR THE CONGO ATROCITIES:

ADAM HOCHSCHILD'S "KING LEOPOLD'S GHOST." Criticism, vol. 4, no. Transcultural Negotiations of Holocaust Memory, 2011, pp. 587-606.

Ndaywel è Nziem, Isidore. Histoire générale du Congo: de l'héritage ancien à la république démocratique. Duculot, 1998.

Starr, Frederick. “The Congo Free State and Congo Belge.” The Journal of Race Development, vol. 1, no. Racial development, 1911, pp. 383-399.

Stengers, Jean. Congo, mythes et réalités: 100 ans d'histoire. Duculot, 1989.
Sternstein, Jerome L. “King Leopold II, Senator Nelson W. Aldrich, and the Strange Beginnings

of American Economic Penetration of the Congo.” King Leopold II, Senator Nelson W. Aldrich, and the Strange Beginnings of American Economic Penetration of the Congo, vol. 2, no. Boston University African Studies Center, 1969, pp. 189-204.

Taylor, John L. “Drop of Rubber Prices.” London Market Report [London], 11 December 1912, p. 3.

Vansina, Jan. Being Colonized: The Kuba Experience in Rural Congo, 1880–1960. University of Wisconsin Press, 2010.

Vanthemsche, Guy. Belgium and the Congo, 1885-1980. Cambridge University Press, 2012. Vianae, Vincent. “King Leopold's Imperialism and the Origins of the Belgian Colonial Party,

1860–1905.” The Journal of Modern History, vol. 80, no. A Special Issue on Metropole and Colony, December 2008, pp. 741-790.